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Conscription, the Military, and Welfare State 
Development: An Introduction 
Herbert Obinger ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Entwicklung von Wehrpflicht, Militär und Wohlfahrtsstaat: Eine 
Einführung«. This paper discusses several possible causal mechanisms through 
which conscription and military interests might have shaped the development of 
western welfare states in the age of industrialized mass warfare. Relevant factors 
are military concerns about the quantity and quality of the population, the ne-
cessity to enhance legitimacy and to secure mass loyalty in times of war and mili-
tary threat, and a growing pressure to compensate the ‘blood tax’ imposed by the 
draft with civic and social rights after the end of war. 
Keywords: Conscription, military, war, welfare state. 
1. Introduction 
A problem untouched by research, which requires a  
historical analysis of the origins of the welfare state […],  
is the effect of mass conscription on welfare state development.  
(Wilensky 1975, 80) 
The welfare state emerged in the age of universal conscription and industrial-
ised mass warfare. During the second half of the 19th century, nearly all conti-
nental European countries1 emulated the Prussian model of military organiza-
tion and introduced universal military conscription, mainly as a consequence of 
a military defeat and rising military tensions (Hintze 1906; Andrzejewski 1954; 
Foerster 1994; Epkenhans and Groß 2003; Asal et al. 2015). Simultaneously, 
scientific progress and industrialisation led to vast improvements in modern 
military technology. The invention of the machine gun and the mechanization 
of the armed forces dramatically enhanced the firepower and destructiveness of 
 
∗  Herbert Obinger, Socium, University of Bremen, Mary Somerville Strasse 5, 28359 Bremen, 
Germany; herbert.obinger@uni-bremen.de. 
1  Britain and her colonies as well as other English speaking democracies were notable excep-
tions (Levi 1996), since conscription was only imposed in wartime or even failed as in Aus-
tralia in a referendum in 1916. This pattern also holds in a global perspective. In a study on 
the determinants of military conscription in more than 100 countries from 1826 to 2000, 
Asal et al. (2015) show that democracies and former British colonies were far less likely to 
opt for conscription, whereas rising military rivalries and inter-state wars accelerated the 
introduction of the draft.  
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weaponry (Porter 1994; Chickering et al. 2012). New means of transportation 
such as the railway and innovative forms of military communication like the 
telephone and telegraph accelerated the territorial expansion of warfare and 
fundamentally altered the conduct of war (Onorato et al. 2014). These changes 
in the underlying conditions of combat meant that every future conflict be-
tween the great European powers would be waged as large-scale, industrialised 
mass warfare. Facing a total war, the existence of the state and the nation were 
at stake since a victory in such a conflict could only be achieved through the 
complete surrender of the adversaries and the annihilation of their military 
capacities. Rising tensions between Europe’s nation-states during the age of 
imperialism strongly increased the likelihood of such a scenario, until it be-
came a terrible reality in 1914 and rendered the widespread belief in a quick 
exchange of fire obsolete.  
Parallel to these developments, European governments introduced the first 
social protection schemes. Labour protection legislation was the first field of 
state intervention in social affairs. Initially limited to children and adolescents, 
labour protection was later extended to women and eventually to the entire 
industrial workforce (Bauer 1923). After enacting social protection schemes for 
especially endangered occupations such as seafaring and mining, the 1880s 
witnessed the breakthrough of social insurance for larger parts of the popula-
tion. The pioneering nations were the constitutional monarchies in Central 
Europe, whereas Europe’s democracies followed with a slight delay. On the 
eve of the First World War, however, all West European states had implement-
ed at least one social insurance program (Alber 1982). 
Whether and to what extent the introduction of universal conscription and 
the consolidation of the modern welfare state are causally interrelated was to 
date not subject of systematic research. This is surprising, as both develop-
ments are closely connected to the formation of nation-states and industrialisa-
tion. Nevertheless, military historiography and comparative welfare state re-
search remained separated disciplines, except for the studies examining the 
provision of welfare benefits to veterans and the military personnel (e.g., Geyer 
1983; Gerber 2012; Mittelstadt 2015; Pawlowsky and Wendelin 2015; Pironti 
2015; Obinger et al. 2020). Apart from that, however, social policy was perpet-
ually on the margins of military historiography, while the welfare state litera-
ture paid very little attention to the military and conscription.  
According to the mainstream of comparative welfare state research, the 
emergence of the modern welfare state is generally attributed to deep-seated 
socio-economic transformations, brought about by the industrial revolution and 
the resulting rise of the labour movement. Additional explanations include state 
and nation-building, secularisation and democratisation, and efforts of autocrat-
ic regimes to enhance legitimacy (e.g., Rimlinger 1971; Wilensky 1975; Flora 
and Heidenheimer 1981; Alber 1982; Schmidt 2005; Castles et al. 2010; Ritter 
2010; Obinger and Petersen 2019). By contrast, the impact the draft, military 
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interests, or power ambitions in foreign policy might have had on welfare state 
development has not been systematically examined. Hence the research gap, to 
which the American sociologist Harold L. Wilensky alluded to almost 50 years 
ago, still exists today. The contributions in this issue aim to fill this gap. To this 
end, we first have to look at causal mechanisms of how conscription and mili-
tary interests might have affected welfare state development. The term “welfare 
state” will herein refer to the broader (Anglo-Saxon) definition which sees 
education as part of the welfare state in addition to its classic pillars of social 
security, labour protection legislation, and welfare. 
2. Theoretical Reflections: Conscriptions, Military 
Interests, and Welfare State Development  
A causal relationship between conscription and a government’s social policies 
might be surprising at first glance. In addition, the military is an unusual sus-
pect for explaining government intervention in the field of social and education 
policy. If it was considered at all, welfare state research saw the military main-
ly as an opponent of social policy as it was assumed that the military is first and 
foremost interested in maximizing the military budget which, in consequence, 
would crowd-out social expenditure (“guns for butter trade-off”). While this 
assumption is highly plausible in wartime, when military spending is skyrock-
eting,2 it is less convincing for the preceding phase of war preparation. Moreo-
ver, the notion of a spending trade-off also neglects regulatory social policies 
such as labour protection legislation which are inexpensive and therefore do 
not constrain the military budget.  
On closer examination, however, a number of potential connections between 
universal conscription, the military, and social policies become apparent, espe-
cially when considering the far-reaching changes in military technology, the 
fundamental socio-economic transformations, and the rising domestic and 
international political tensions taking place during the second half of the 19th 
century. The profound changes in the organization of the armed forces resulting 
from the implementation of the draft and the massive technological advances in 
the weaponry not only occurred in the age of continuing industrialization, ur-
banization, and demographic transition but also coincided with the age of impe-
rialism, nation-building, and progressing democratization. It is the interplay of 
these developments that, at least from a theoretical perspective, might have 
generated an impetus for social policy reform and a heightened military interest 
in these issues.  
 
2  In 1943, for example, military spending in Germany made up 70%, in Great Britain 55%, 
and in the USA 42% of the national income (Harris 1998, Table 1-8). 
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At least five causal mechanisms might link general conscription and welfare 
reform. They will be discussed separately in the following sections. Overall, 
the focus is on the quantity and quality of the population, the tensions between 
citizen’s rights and duties as well as militarily motivated aspects of political 
legitimacy. However, the relevance of each of these mechanisms significantly 
depends on national, (geo-)political, and socio-demographic contexts. Addi-
tionally, only specific welfare programs, not the entire welfare state itself, are 
potentially of military interest. 
2.1   The Amount of “Human Material” 
“Nations lacking children are calmer than nations with plenty and they have to 
be, because they do not have enough soldiers” (Kahn 1930, 191). In the age of 
total war, demographic and biopolitical issues increasingly became the focus of 
the military’s strategic planning (Titmuss 1958). Carl von Clausewitz’s old 
doctrine of the “superiority of numbers, which should first and foremost be 
sought” (von Clausewitz 2012 [1832], 203) not only applied to the arsenal of 
weapons but also to the number of soldiers ready to mobilise. The underlying 
reason was simple: military strategists assumed a linear relationship between 
the amount of what they, in a derogative manner, called “human material” and 
military strength (Hartmann 2011). Inspired by the military success of the levée 
en masse (i.e., the massive mobilisation of patriotic citizens during the Napole-
onic Wars), Prussia and later on many other European nations emulated this 
model by implementing compulsory military service. Mass conscription and 
the resulting millions-strong armies, the massive geographic expansion of 
warfare through the railroad, and new communication technologies made the 
“superiority of numbers” even more important. Erich Ludendorff (1937, 49), an 
apologist of total war, declared: “In wartime, numbers are only too often of 
crucial significance […]. The importance of numbers must be recognised with 
utmost clarity.”3 In a similar vein, Chief of the General Staff of the Austro-
Hungarian Army Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf stated that  
the advantage of numerical superiority in combat was strengthened by modern 
weaponry, especially for those planning a war of aggression. Even though 
other factors for waging a war remain important, the ‘number’ is nonetheless 
of top priority, mainly because it is a factor that can be measured with abso-
lute certainty even in times of peace.4  
This issue gained increasing political attention from the late 19th century on-
wards. A major reason was the gradual demographic transition from very high 
to exceedingly lower birth and death rates, set in motion by socio-economic 
 
3  Own translation. 
4  This quote comes from an article published against Conrad’s will with the heading “Mein 
Programm” in Danzer’s Armee-Zeitung, vol. 47 (1906). 
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modernization, secularization, and advances in medicine. Even though the total 
population continued to grow considerably,5 demographic transition increasing-
ly raised military concerns because military planning was focused on the 
younger segments of the population (i.e., the future generations of soldiers). 
Particularly the birth rate became a key issue for military strategists. In fact, the 
demographic change starting in the late 19th century was immense, as the birth 
rates in the western world went down by about 50 percent between 1870 and 
1940 (Teitelbaum and Winter 1985, 14). However, the onset of this process 
varied strongly, depending on the country’s level of modernisation and indus-
trialisation (Kahn 1930). France was unique in this respect, as the birth-and 
death rates decreased very early and simultaneously (Tomlinson 1985). The 
comparison of French birth rates with the number of births in the (rival) neigh-
bour states fuelled fears of depopulation and prophecies of an approaching 
demographic demise (“finis Galliae”). In consequence, the “Alliance nationale 
pour l’accroissement de la population française” (National Alliance for the 
Growth of the French Population), a lobby organization for pronatalist policies, 
was established in 1896. Ensuing debates were inspired by military aspirations 
and galvanized through the higher birth rates in Italy and Germany (Hartmann 
2011; Dörr 2020, in this volume). Once those countries had also been gripped 
by demographic transition, the expansionist aspirations of Italian fascism and 
German National Socialism prompted similar debates and apocalyptic demo-
graphic scenarios. The size of the population was simply equated to a nation’s 
power and influence on the international stage. In a speech held in May 1927, 
Benito Mussolini demanded an increase of the Italian population to 60 million 
people during the second half of the 20th century, because “what are 40 million 
Italians compared to 90 million Germans and 200 million Slavs?”6 In a similar 
vein, the Nazis considered declining birth rates as an existential threat to the 
Volksgemeinschaft (national community) and an omen of impending destruc-
tion of the people, or Volkstod (Reidegeld 1989). Again, a simple relationship 
between population size, birth rates, and military strength was alleged (e.g., 
Staemmler 1934, 72), because “a people lacking descendants has lost its place 
in the world” (Hoffmann 1938, 23). Nazi sympathizer Erich Ludendorff viewed 
declining birth rates as an immeasurable danger with tangible impacts on the 
German Wehrmacht. He therefore advocated for health-promoting and prona-
talist measures imbued with eugenic and racial principles with a view to create 
“a healthy, reproducing population, which would strengthen the army and be 
able to wage and endure a total war” (Ludendorff 1937, 23). Italy and Nazi 
Germany are certainly extreme examples of pronatalism motivated by war 
preparation, but demographic transition and the impact of the Great War on 
 
5  Population growth in turn nurtured military expansionist tendencies; new living space was 
sought to supply all citizens.  
6  Quoted in Forcucci (2010).  
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demographics made population policy and eugenics a major issue almost eve-
rywhere in the interwar period (Kahn 1930).  
Once a pronatalist demographic policy is on the political agenda and the 
government attempts to influence the birth rate, families, young women, moth-
ers, and young children become primary target groups of state intervention. 
From a theoretical perspective, there is a wide variety of possible policies 
available to increase birth rates. The oldest and arguably most ineffective 
measures are those targeting abortion rights and access to contraception. Nev-
ertheless, these measures were often implemented because they were cheaper 
than policies discussed below. Historically, the termination of pregnancies was 
often outlawed to counteract a population decline. Military aspirations were 
also a common underlying motive for the introduction of such restrictive 
measures (Jütte 1993). In Nazi Germany, for example, abortions were prohibit-
ed by law,7 forcing other great powers to act, in part for military reasons. After 
Germany reintroduced general conscription in 1935, Stalin decreed a ban of 
abortions, despite the Soviet Union having been the first country in the world to 
introduce a liberal regulation of abortion. In addition to criminal law and gov-
ernment pronatalist propaganda, social and fiscal policies can be used to in-
crease birth rates. Governments can encourage citizens to start a family by 
providing transfer payments and tax reliefs with a view to compensate the costs 
of family formation. Secondly, affordable housing for families is of special 
political importance. A third approach to raise population figures is to roll back 
infant mortality and to improve public health. Labour protection legislation to 
improve the health status of young women and expectant mothers is of particu-
lar importance in this respect. Measures might include prohibiting employment 
prior and subsequent to childbirth or banning night work for women. Policies 
to combat child mortality include various measures to improve nursing and 
medical services, public hygiene, and nutrition. In terms of public health, vene-
real diseases raised military concerns as sexually transmitted infections posed a 
significant threat to the army’s fighting power but also increased stillbirths and 
sterility. Overall, however, the occurrence of pronatalist population policies 
strongly depended on national contexts. A pronatalist population policy is more 
likely under conditions of war planning and in wartime with its heavy human 
losses and declining birth rates. 
2.2  Quality of the “Human Material”: Public Health  
Apart from the mere quantity, the transformation of socio-economic and tech-
nological conditions outlined above also led to an increased military scrutiny of 
a population’s quality (Titmuss 1958). Universal conscription was introduced 
 
7  This was only true for members of the so-called “Volksgemeinschaft.” At the same time, the 
Nazis used eugenic policies and finally genocide to eliminate the “non-Aryan” population. 
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in a time of rapidly advancing industrialisation that lead to an erosion of the 
lifestyles and working conditions of a world formerly dominated by artisans 
and agricultural workers. In the course of the Great Transformation (Polanyi 
1944), the industrial sector increasingly became the employer of the rural popu-
lation. The resulting mass migration into urban areas lead to devastating social 
conditions in public hygiene and housing and was a main factor in the dissolv-
ing of traditional family structures. Familial support networks, feudalism, and 
guilds, which had formerly provided rudimentary social protection, lost their 
significance. The labour surplus generated by the rural exodus and the lack of 
market power of the emerging industrial proletariat depressed wages. While the 
landowner to some extent had a social responsibility for his workers in the 
manorial system, wages in the emerging capitalist labour markets were com-
pletely detached from such obligations (Achinger 1958; Ritter 2010). Since 
government interventions in the labour market were minimal during the golden 
age of liberalism, the new industrial and impersonal working conditions were 
dangerous, payments volatile, and the duration of employment often uncertain. 
Children and adolescents were also exposed to these precarious working condi-
tions characterized by overlong working hours and only little time to rest. The 
combination of a widely deregulated industrial labour market and the erosion 
of traditional institutions providing social protection resulted in a massive 
impoverishment of large parts of the population.  
The demise of the agricultural society also had a lasting impact on the com-
position of the army. Economic structural change led to a decline of the agri-
cultural sector, which traditionally had been the army’s most important reser-
voir for recruiting healthy and morally reliable soldiers. Instead of the strong 
young men from the countryside, more and more industrial workers came to 
stand in front of the draft board. The physical examination of those conscripted 
provided policymakers with the first mass data set on the health status and 
educational competencies of young men (Hartmann 2011). The deterioration of 
working and living conditions caused by industrialization and urbanization was 
mirrored in high numbers of young men who were deemed unfit for military 
service. In the 1830s and 40s, two thirds of young Prussian men were declared 
unfit (Frevert 2001, 106). By 1880, more than 50 percent of the young men 
mustered in Germany and Switzerland did not pass their physical (Cohn 1879), 
while the rate in Austria-Hungary was even higher (Tálos 1981).  
Typically, the percentage of rejected recruits from cities and industrialized 
regions was higher than that of those coming from the countryside. It is there-
fore conceivable that concerns about the poor physical condition of young men 
may well have figured as part of the motivation for measures to improve public 
health. This is where social and health policies come into play. 
Examples include labour protection legislation (e.g., working time regula-
tions), better nutrition, and improved hygiene to roll-back rampant diseases. 
From a military point of view, such measures should only focus on children 
HSR 45 (2020) 2  │  14 
and adolescents (i.e., prospective soldiers and mothers) in an effort to secure 
the nation’s future defence power. In fact, there is some evidence that military 
motives were a driving force behind early labour protection legislation. A con-
temporary leading expert on international labour protection legislation noted 
with regard to the 19th century:  
The very same century that freed the entrepreneur of the constraints imposed 
by the guilds and provided him with the greatest liberty to participate in the 
competition for markets, also forced him to organize production in such a way 
as to neither infringe on the adolescent worker’s productivity and fitness for 
military service nor the adult worker’s livelihood. (Bauer 1903, 79)  
One of the first examples of such legislation is the Prussian “Regulative on the 
Employment of Adolescent Workers in Factories,” enacted on 9 March 1839. 
Its impetus originated from a military report (Landwehrbericht) of the Prussian 
lieutenant general Heinrich Wilhelm von Horn, in which he attributed the 
dwindling number of recruits to the proliferation of child labour in the industri-
al regions of the Rhineland. This law included labour protection measures for 
children and adolescents and only allowed minors to work if they were also 
attending school. Despite deficits in terms of implementation, this act can be 
seen as an early proof for militarily inspired governmental action in the fields 
of education and social policy in a pioneering nation of general conscription 
(see Dörr et al. 2020, in this volume). In a similar vein, the military disaster of 
the Boer Wars (1880/81 and 1899-1902) was attributed to the negative effects 
of industrialisation and urbanization in the British homeland and it has been 
shown that concerns about “national degeneration” led to measures improving 
welfare for children and adolescents (Dwork 1987). A third example of militar-
ily motivated policies to improve public health comes from Japan. On the eve 
of the Pacific war, high-ranking Japanese military officials established a Minis-
try of Health and massively expanded the coverage of health insurance. The 
motivation being that too many recruits were deemed unfit for duty at a time 
when the right-wing military government planned a massive war of expansion 
that required millions of soldiers (Kasza 2002).  
Almost everywhere, the debate on the quality of the population was increas-
ingly influenced by eugenic ideas. Reaching from Gobineau in France in the 
1850s and Galton in Great Britain in the 1880s to the Rassenhygiene of the 
Nazis, health and population policy based on eugenic principles was seen on 
the one hand as a vehicle to provide the army with “good human material.” On 
the other hand, eugenicists often were war apologists, warfare was considered 
to select the best and strongest (Melville 1910, 54).  
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2.3  Quality of the “Human Material“: Education 
“Our conscript armies[Volksheere] do not need thoughtless machines, but 
thinking warriors, because they alone enable us to hope for success in the war 
of the future.”8 Due to the rapidly developing advances in (military) technolo-
gy, national armies increasingly needed soldiers with higher qualifications and 
skills. The service and maintenance of technically more sophisticated weaponry 
and communication systems required basic reading, writing, and mathematical 
skills. Literacy was also an important prerequisite for effective propaganda and 
mass indoctrination (Posen 1993) with a view to raise the soldiers’ willingness 
to sacrifice for and to foster the “military-civic spirit” of the nation (Hintze 
1906, 34). In multi-nation states, this required a common language, and com-
mand of this language was essential for effective communication within the 
military. Several languages were spoken in the Austro-Hungarian army, for 
example. However, the language of command and working language in the 
common army was German and every soldier had to learn at least a small num-
ber of German commands (Stone 1966; Hämmerle 2007).  
Although conscription meant that the more educated classes entered the 
armed forces, which was one of the reasons for its implementation, there was a 
wide gap in educational attainment both within and across countries in the 19th 
century. Illiteracy was still a widespread problem, especially in the south-
eastern parts of Europe. Due to the fact that the armies maintained their own 
educational institutions and operated programmes to fight illiteracy, they liter-
ally became a “school of the nation” (Duffy 1985; Frevert 2001; Epkenhans 
and Groß 2003), it is less clear to what extent public education reforms were 
shaped by military interests. Comparative studies in the social sciences con-
cerning the historical development of primary education (e.g., Soysal and 
Strang 1989; Ansell and Lindvall 2013) have to date neglected this question. 
Economists, by contrast, have demonstrated in an econometric study that mili-
tary defeats and military competition led to higher levels of public education 
spending (Aghion et al. 2012). There is evidence for Prussia, France, and Aus-
tria-Hungary, that the military tried to manipulate school curricula by insisting 
on patriotic education, more physical training lessons, and even target practice 
in middle schools (e.g., Führ 1968; Messerschmidt 1980; Posen 1993; Obinger 
and Kovacevic 2016). Primary education was not only considered to be an 
important vehicle for promoting a common national language and national 
unity, but also for conveying stereotypes and prejudices. Overall, however, the 
impact of the military on education policy was to date not systematically exam-
ined (Grawe 2020, in this special issue). 
 
8  Captain in the reserve of the imperial and royal Austro-Hungarian Army, Danzer’s Armee 
Zeitung 11 April 1912.  
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2.4  From Civic Duties to Civic Rights  
“Conscription, like taxation, demands representation” (Levi 2002, 342). Mass 
conscription has significantly changed the relationship between the state and its 
citizens because the citizens’ support of conscription “hinges on the perception 
of an acceptable policy bargain whose terms government actors are likely to 
uphold” (Levi 1996, 134). Since mandatory military service imposed huge 
burdens on young male citizens, the implementation of conscription raised the 
issue of how to distribute the personal risks and costs of military service in a 
fair manner. This “logic of equal sacrifice” (Wilensky 1975) is closely related 
to two questions. On the one hand, what is the contribution to the overall war 
effort of those who are not included in the draft and, on the other hand, what 
rights are granted in compensation for the civic duty of military service im-
posed by the state? Both questions are potentially of considerable relevance for 
social policy, albeit in an indirect manner.  
Concerning the compensation of military duty, it has long been argued that 
general conscription meant a large step towards equality. The reason being that 
the draft was a compulsory institution with massive infringements of individual 
autonomy. Military service was lengthy, strenuous, and often humiliating due 
to military drills and harsh punishments. It also involved high opportunity costs 
and, in times of war, a high risk of death. Considering all these downsides of 
conscription, the question of what soldiers would gain in return for a duty man-
dated by the state was inevitable. A key aspect of this quid pro quo mechanism 
was the right to vote. From the outset, the ruling elites in Europe’s autocracies 
feared that the draft would entail demands for civic and political rights. Metter-
nich, for example, called for the abolishment of conscription at the Congress of 
Vienna and almost everywhere, the ruling elites did not enact general conscrip-
tion voluntarily but mainly in response to military defeats and severe domestic 
and foreign crises (Andrzejewski 1954, 69; Asal et al. 2015). Once conscription 
had been institutionalised, however, the pressure to offer concessions for lack-
ing political rights increased. According to Andrzejewski (1954, 33) this pres-
sure rises with the “military participation ratio,” i.e., the number of people 
under arms.  
The nexus between conscription and suffrage was recognized early on by 
Hermann Ritter von Orges, a former Lieutenant of the Prussian army.  
Democratizing the state requires the militarization of the nation, because not 
the man as such but only the citizen who is aware of his duties, feels as part of 
the community and subordinates himself to the common interest, has a claim 
to civic rights. Universal suffrage and general conscription back and reinforce 
each other. (von Orges 1868, 314)  
In a similar vein, Otto Hintze (1906, 34) argued that the introduction of con-
scription meant “an unstoppable tendency towards a free constitution.” Alt-
hough he rejected the notion of a simple linear relationship between conscrip-
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tion and suffrage, history would show “that the fulfilment of public duties leads 
to the acquisition of public rights in the long run” (Hintze 1906, 39).  
The occurrence of war is likely a catalysing and conditioning force in this 
respect. In fact, it was argued that mass warfare in particular, with horrendous-
ly high military and civilian casualties, created a “democratic imperative” 
(Porter 1994) since the men serving in the military (and the women and unfit 
men replacing them in industry) demanded political and social rights in com-
pensation for their service and sacrifices. Empirical studies support this notion 
of a close nexus between the suffrage extensions, electoral reform (e.g., im-
plementation of proportional representation), conscription, and mass warfare 
(Przeworski 2009; Hicks 2013; Ingesson et al. 2018). Ingesson et al. (2018), for 
example, use a global sample to show that conscription did not lead to the 
guarantee of political rights per se. The impact of conscription on suffrage 
extensions was rather conditional on warfare. The crucial point is that these 
political transformations unleashed by the interaction of war and conscription 
marked important turning points for welfare state development. The waves of 
democratisation after both world wars set the stage for new and more redistrib-
utive public social policies. Additionally, the introduction of proportional rule 
during and after World War I critically shaped political coalition building pro-
cesses and, in consequence, the emergence of different types of welfare re-
gimes (Esping-Andersen 1990; Manow 2009).  
A further but less studied aspect of the quid pro quo logic is the compensa-
tion of conscription by the provision of social rights. Similar to the provision of 
political rights, there is evidence that the enactment and guarantee of social 
rights is also conditional on warfare in the sense that new welfare programs 
were introduced during or, more frequently, in the immediate aftermath of total 
war (Dudley and Witt 2004; Obinger et al. 2018; Obinger and Schmitt 2019a, 
b; Schmitt and Pironti 2020, in this volume). 
The second issue related to the logic of equal sacrifice, namely the question 
of how those exempted from military service contribute to national defence and 
war efforts, could not be solved by granting rights but only by imposing new 
duties. From an economic perspective, the draft is equivalent to a tax because 
conscription supplies the state with cheap and forced labour. In consequence, 
opportunity costs of conscription are high (Oi 1967; Poutvaara and Wagener 
2007). New findings in comparative political economy suggest that a fair bur-
den sharing of ‘war costs’ was mostly accomplished through the tax-system. 
More specifically, the “blood tax” imposed by conscription led to a “conscrip-
tion of income” (Bullock 1917). Scheve and Stasavage (2010, 2012, 2016) 
provide compelling evidence that the “logic of equal sacrifice” gave rise to a 
progressive and higher taxation of income and wealth. Men not obliged to 
serve in the military (mainly elderly wealthy men) were subjected to higher 
taxation in the name of burden sharing and social justice. In a similar vein, 
military compensation taxes were levied on recruits rejected as unfit (Cohn 
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1879). Consistent with the idea of burden sharing, revenues from these taxes 
were often used to support disabled veterans (Thierl 1892). As a result, con-
scription and mobilisation for mass warfare triggered major fiscal reforms, 
which, in the long run, facilitated the establishment of social security systems 
because new taxes and higher tax rates imposed in wartime were not, or only in 
part, revoked after an armistice (Peacock and Wiseman 1961).  
2.5  Conscription, War, and Mass Loyalty 
In the age of mass warfare, “the co-operation of the masses is essential for the 
successful prosecution of war” (Andrzejewski 1954, 33). During wartime, the 
mobilization of the entire nation for the war effort, the willingness of self-
sacrifice, and measures to strengthen national unity are essential. In other 
words, securing mass compliance is indispensable for warfare. Beginning with 
Napoleon III and Bismarck, social policy was often used to generate mass 
loyalty and to strengthen the output legitimacy of political regimes (Adler 
1897). Measures aimed at increasing output legitimacy (i.e., legitimacy through 
performance) are particularly important for autocracies and for totalitarian 
regimes. Götz Aly, for example, has argued that “continuous bribery in social 
affairs formed the basis for internal cohesion in Hitler’s Volksstaat” (Aly 2006, 
89). He portrayed the Nazi regime as a “socio-political dictatorship of complai-
sance” (sozialpolitische Gefälligkeitsdiktatur) which relied on armed robbery, 
expropriations an mass murder to finance welfare in favour of the Volksge-
meinschaft, thereby securing mass loyalty for the regime and possibly pacify-
ing the home front. A major example for the ‘carrot-stick strategy’ adopted by 
the Nazi regime is the 1940/41 Sozialwerk des Deutschen Volkes. This was a 
plan by DAF leader Robert Ley concerning a major expansion of social policy 
so as to offer the German population a positive objective of warfare and to raise 
the legitimacy of the regime (Smelser 1989, 260ff.; Recker 1985, 82-154). 
However, issues of legitimacy are also important for democracies in times 
of war or in militarily threatening situations. Against this backdrop, social 
policy might be an appropriate vehicle to enhance mass loyalty and to mobilize 
soldiers and civilians for the overall war effort. For example, governments 
might rely on welfare state promises by framing war as a fight for a better 
future. Well-known examples for ambitious welfare state promises in wartime 
include Roosevelt’s “Bill of Economic Rights,” the British Beveridge-Plan, or 
the Atlantic Charta, which declared the guarantee of social rights in the post-
war period an official war aim of the allied powers (Nullmeier and Kaufmann 
2010). It is also no coincidence that in Great Britain the term ‘welfare state,’ 
which had hitherto been confined to intellectual circles, gained importance in 
the 1940s and was used in deliberate demarcation from the Nazi warfare state 
(Petersen and Petersen 2013).  
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Issues of legitimacy are also important in situations of latent military rivalry. 
The Cold War is a case in point. It was only after the end of the Cold War that 
the demise of the mass conscript army began. Regime competition between the 
two rival blocs increased the necessity to enhance legitimacy and mass compli-
ance on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In addition to military rivalry, the ideo-
logical competition between the Western and the Soviet bloc nurtured ambi-
tions to outperform the rival bloc in terms of socio-economic performance and 
to flaunt the achievements of one’s own political and economic regime 
(Obinger and Schmitt 2011; Petersen 2013). Overall, solving ‘bread and butter 
issues’ by promoting social policy or economic growth is a powerful and his-
torically often practiced strategy for strengthening national unity, political 
legitimacy, and domestic stability.  
3. Outline of the Special Issue  
The previous sections have discussed several possible links between conscrip-
tion, military interests, war, and the welfare state. It was argued that some 
fields of social policy, by virtue of their pacifying effects on domestic politics 
and their aforementioned impacts on birth rates and public health, have a po-
tential military value. In consequence, domestic welfare reforms might create 
important prerequisites for the power ambitions of states in foreign affairs.9 
This explains why social policy might attract the interest of the military already 
in the run-up to military conflict. From this perspective, social policy and wel-
fare reform can be seen as vehicles of war preparation or soziale Kriegsrüstung 
(Potthoff 1915; Zimmermann 1915). War itself has further accentuated the 
importance of social policy. The horrors of total war created social needs of a 
magnitude that inevitably required government intervention in social affairs. 
Both world wars led to a shift in public social policy that was not only restrict-
ed to the social protection of veterans and their dependents but also affected the 
social protection of civilians (Obinger et al. 2018). 
The following eight articles of this special issue will each examine one of 
the above-mentioned links between conscription, war, and the welfare state.  
Nikolas Dörr, Lukas Grawe, and Herbert Obinger examine the military ori-
gins of labour protection legislation in Prussia and Imperial Germany. The 
authors demonstrate that military arguments were repeatedly used to justify and 
legitimate welfare reforms from the very outset. However, the military was 
neither the key actor nor were military concerns about the physical strength of 
recruits the predominant motive informing labour protection legislation. A 
major exception was World War I, when the military became a crucial actor 
 
9  On the relationship between social policy and world politics, see also Reidegeld (2006, 
268ff).  
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and, for military functionalist reasons, backed some path-breaking reforms, 
which had lasting effects in the field of industrial relations and collective la-
bour law.  
Focusing on Austria-Hungary, Lukas Grawe analyses whether military de-
feat and conscription motivated reforms in the field of primary education. After 
the defeat in the battle of Königgrätz in 1866, the newly created dual monarchy 
quickly introduced general conscription in 1868. Only one year later, a major 
school reform (the Reichsvolksschulgesetz) was adopted in the Austrian part of 
the empire. Grawe shows that military arguments did play a role in this respect 
as the military defeat against Prussia was attributed, among other things, to the 
poor education and high levels of illiteracy among the Austrian soldiers. In line 
with the findings of Dörr et al., however, such military concerns were not the 
key driving force underlying this change in primary education.  
The contribution by Nikolas Dörr focuses on population policy in France. 
Compared to Germany and the United Kingdom, France lagged behind in its 
welfare state development. A notable exception, however, was the pronatalist 
family policy. Child benefits, tax reliefs for large families, and improvements 
in maternal and infant protection were implemented earlier and more extensive-
ly than in other European countries. Important reasons behind these policies, 
which were introduced while the country was caught up in a massive depopula-
tion anxiety (“finis Galliae”), were, at least partly, of a military nature. Nikolas 
Dörr analyses this nexus between the military, welfare state development, and 
the fears of depopulation with a focus on the Third French Republic (1870-
1940). Contrary to the standard account that state institutions in France would 
have hampered rather than promoted the introduction and expansion of the 
welfare state, he argues that the French state has promoted a pronatalist family 
and population policy out of military necessity. 
Beginning with Italian unification, Pierluigi Pironti examines the warfare-
welfare nexus in Italy. Conscription, the wars in Africa, and the modernization 
of the armed forces triggered some military-related welfare measures such as 
military pensions, but only the Great War marked an important turning point in 
welfare legislation. Italy’s participation in industrialized mass warfare led to 
social reforms between 1915 and 1919 with a view to compensate the horrors 
and the tremendous social needs generated by the conflict. The adopted reforms 
not only covered veterans and their dependents but also improved the social 
protection and rights of civilians, as exemplified by the extension of accident 
insurance to agricultural workers in 1917 and the introduction of unemploy-
ment insurance two years later. However, the extreme political polarization in 
the post-war period and the resulting rise of fascism brought this short reform 
episode to an end.  
Olivier Burtin uses a comparative perspective to examine the evolution of 
veterans’ benefits in the United States from the colonial period until the Vi-
etnam War. He shows that America’s frequent and victorious involvement in 
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warfare, conscription in times of war and during the Cold War, the early intro-
duction of white male suffrage, and the lack of civilian war casualties contrib-
uted to the emergence of a huge and generous veterans’ welfare state. The 
degree of social protection for veterans is unique in international comparison, 
which is a major reason why the country stands out in comparative social poli-
cy more broadly. From early state-building onwards, veterans were granted 
exclusive welfare benefits which separated them from the rest of the population 
as veterans could successfully claim that they had shouldered most of the bur-
dens of war. 
Issues of legitimacy related to war and military threat are discussed by 
Klaus Petersen. He examines the relationship between war, the military, and 
welfare state development in Denmark. Studying three episodes of (military) 
threats between ca. 1850 and 1950, Petersen shows that the welfare state was 
part of the national defence strategy of a small nation lacking military resources 
and power. This strategy was most pronounced during the Cold War.  
Two contributions examine the nexus between conscription and social poli-
cy in the global south. The article by Delia González de Reufels looks at Chile. 
Chile is known as a pioneer in social policy in Latin America while it has also 
been characterized as a country in whose national history military conflicts 
have loomed large. Both fields – Chilean social policy and military history – 
have met with considerable scholarly interest over the last years, yet the role of 
the Chilean armed forces in the development and implementation of social 
policies remained unexplored. Delia González de Reufels traces the interests 
and possible influence of the Chilean army on health care and education. Using 
writings of army doctors and of military reformers who became more out-
spoken after Chile won the War of the Pacific against Peru and Bolivia (1879-
1884), her article explores the impact of the army on these classic fields of state 
intervention. She furthermore analyzes the debate on general conscription, 
examines the arguments used in favor of universal military service, and assess-
es potential connections to social policy issues.  
The contribution by Carina Schmitt addresses the role of the military, war-
fare, and conscription for the provision of social rights and social protection in 
former French African colonies, especially in French West Africa, from the 
beginning of the 20th century until the short aftermath of World War II. No 
other imperial power militarized its colonial societies to the extent that France 
did. The article shows that the introduction of mass conscription and World 
War I did not result in any systematic handling of social issues in French West 
Africa. However, the introduction of the draft and the experience of World War 
I molded soldiers and veterans as a societal group, which then started to de-
mand social rights. This development paved the way for later social changes in 
the course of World War II. It heralded major reforms, such as uniform pen-
sions for soldiers throughout the Empire, the abolishment of the Code 
D’Indigénat, and the expansion of education and health services. 
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